MI6 | Law and Intelligence | Loopholes

Credit Default Swaps killed the Moody 10 years ago…how will the FSB and CIA fare in Round II?

The names of the instruments might change, and the names of the participants might change, but history shows us, the outcome is normally the same.  The outcome for the many is nearly always eventually determined by the will of the few.  The question is.  Who are the few?

Now what new instrument do we know of that is not on a regulated exchange and has no reporting requirements just like CDS's in 2008.  Hmm...let's think for a Bit.  Here are some of our predictions.

Thought recoginition and mapping research began a long time ago. However, recent developments connecting Neuroscience with technology, will literally change how we think in the not too distant future.

Take the online tests!

Is there another side to you?

MI6 Free Onlien Tests

Money Laundering Weaknesses

This article was published prior to news that the Government was planning to 'shake up' the ease with which potential money launderers could infiltrate the current system.  Although maybe somewhat prophetic, and pleased that action has finally been taken, the writer will review the actual changes as they come into effect to consider their likely impact.

This particular section focusses on some clearly identifiable flaws or weaknesses in the current system which allows potential money launderers, terrorist networks and criminals to operate relatively easily.  Is intended solely for the benefit of those with a desire to see these processes tightened.  Whether or not these weaknesses and recommendations for improvement are taken on board or not, is entirely at the discretion of the justice system. 


Organisations such as the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC, part of GCHQ) and the National Crime Agency (NCA) as well as several other divisions within Law Enforcement and Government, work tirelessly together to combine intelligence and information to tackle all areas of the Money Laundering network.  It is safe to say however, that certain areas attract more funding and resources.  As with any governmental, or 'quasi-governmental' body there is an element of bureaucracy that unfortunately their targets do not have to contend with themselves, despite being 'organised'. 


The upshot is that cogs will inevitably move slower sometimes due to their structure and the democratic need for increased accountability and transparency.  Therefore some issues will tend to slip through the net.  Clearly, these agencies are aware of some of the weaknesses as they are public knowledge.  It is not rocket science.  However, in practise if some of these simple issues are addressed by the agencies mentioned above, the results could be exponential and worthwhile, given some modest tweaks.  Not all the weaknesses are highlighted here for obvious reasons, and listing them would simply be counter-productive.  That said, the battle against the launderers or any entity that manipulates our financial or legal systems to finance illegal or terrorist activities which may eventually harm the security of the UK, should always be highlighted and remedies made where possible.  Even if this process starts with increased vigilance in some of the areas described here.  Certainly with exponential technological growth in mind, AI system will inevitably increase the speed of targeted data gathering.

Other sections of this site will provide a wider insight into the sheers scale of the problem and what many of our organisations are here to stamp out.

They say that if a snake comes into your kitchen you don't feed it, you chop its head off.  Somewhat simplistic and pandering to the Hollywood treadmill maybe?  To some extent yes, but the argument holds true.  For many years it has been considered vital to cut off financial fluidity to those individuals and organisations that feed the terrorists threats.  The subject of terrorist financing is huge and one which has been tackled by many of the finest academics, specialists and investigative organisations in the world.  It is the sheer size and weight of the topic that is the very problem itself because the time and resources required to monitor and assess the activities of terrorist financiers means that ultimately something has to give.  Refinement and efficient targeting is therefore of paramount importance and that, inevitably, means that some activities will slip through the net.  It is simply impossible to cover all areas of the network, especially when our enemies continue to develop branches of that network that are nothing more than 'noise' and fabricated to create a diversion of our time and resources.  The one saving grace is that at least in this type of battlefield the boundaries are known and we are able to focus on well known, tried and tested means of laundering funds and transferring those funds throughout the network.  For example, financial institutions are subject to increasing levels of scrutiny as part of the financial and legal framework within the UK to ensure that as many participants are aware of the significant consequences of not adhering to Anti Money Laundering procedures as possible.  In that respect we can use the public and professionals within the banking system to operate within a strict framework, and that can surely only be beneficial in assisting the fight against funding terror.  

The intricate and increasingly sophisticated means with which the criminals (not just terrorists) by pass our security measures requires constant supervision.  Here we outline some of the more recent methods and assets used to facilitate this activity and offer some suggestions as to which route the financing road might take from here on in.

The UK has the most robust Anti Money Laundering systems right?

NO. One would think so, but some significant weaknesses still exist which actually makes the UK an attractive target for channeling laundered funds and creating a 'noisy network' of elaborate distractions.  Probably at the core of the reason for this is the codependent relationship between the City and our Politicians.  If our systems are too robust we run the risk of alienating genuine foreign investment and therefore in turn we frustrate those market participants in search of growth.  The policy makers on the other hand have to cater for both groups namely the financiers and investment houses as well as the public and politicians wanting action against, what is probably the greater threat out of the two, namely terrorist money laundering.  As always they balance tentatively between the two and this, unfortunately, means loopholes will remain un-filled.  A recent example would be the laws and regulations concerning company formations in the UK and their relationship with the offshore businesses.  To understand why this is of particular relevance, it would be useful to provide some perspective as to the scale of the problem as it exists now. 


Please note: This information is solely for the benefit of those seeking to improve current systems and is not meant to be used to solicit, or in any way advocate its use for, or engage in, any activities which could result in 'illegal' activity as defined under current UK legislation.  This information is being publicised for these reasons and for educational purposes only. The owners and operators of this site do not gain financially or otherwise, or result in any losses as a result of honest representations (B 2 Fraud Act 2006 (c. 35) made in this site.  Nor are they untrue or misleading.  Please refer to our website terms before proceeding



Knowing the information or knowing how to bend the rules themselves is not the crime.  It's what is then done with that information that creates the problem.  That said, as with our galaxy of stars (the celestial type), we don't need to see them to know they're there, we can look for what they've left behind as evidence of their existence and in turn establish some clue as to where they might be going.


Obtaining a new bank account, passport, drivers license, utility bill, credit history and company, is a relatively easy proposition nowadays, although some recent cases of fraud have exposed areas of weakness in the current system.  It is public knowledge that the Government is looking at ways of tightening the rules concerning name changes and the use of online Deed Poll services to stamp out fraud.  There is a strong argument however, that despite changing the rules the players will remain active and just look for another 'game' to play.  For the secret intelligence services, leaving the snare active and guiding the rodent down a particular route, has its obvious benefits. So, here is the information. Do with it what you will.



The first stage is they will change their name.  Let's say you are John Smith now and you want to change to Joseph Ward.  This is simple.  Go on line and buy a pre-printed deed poll certificate with a legitimate company changing your name to Joseph Ward.  Keep this on hold for the time being, because there are other changes you will need to make next in order to assist you later, notably the address.  But for the time being, you can assume that the person Joe Ward is soon to exist.


This is slightly more complicated but nonetheless still relatively easy to do.

There are numerous online company's specialising in mail forwarding (an area Law and Government could also focus on tightening up) and they provide seemingly legitimate residential addresses for a monthly fee.  According to the law, these organisations simply have to carry identity checks to satisfy AML (anti money-laundering) regulations so that the addressees can receive official government documents such as passports, drivers licenses etc.

Approach "Post Company 1" and open an account under the name John Smith and provide them with your Drivers License.  You will obtain an online account which will allow the mail to be forwarded to your actual address for the time being. You can pay for all sorts of fancy additions such as SMS alerts,  have the post company scan a document and email you etc etc.  These are legitimate services often offered to individuals or families moving abroad for a prolonged period of time and require a UK postal address cheaply.


It is general knowledge that a typical fraudster, criminal or launderer of funds creates 'layers' during the development of their processes.  It is a classic technique designed to cause confusion.  There are those who argue that that the 'layering' approach is not actually that practical in reality because at the end of the day it only takes some relatively focussed geeks to follow a trail, and the idea of 'layers' is simply building on the notion of laziness.  In reality this should not happen.  

So, let say you (he), John Smith lives at:


1 Money Road,




You have created a 'residential' address now at:

1 Clean Road




But, they have used the name Mr Joesph Ward to set up as the account name.  For really clean flow, they might consider setting up an account with companies such as Pockitt or equivalent beforehand.  In the shuffle and chaos to populate a new and growing market, some of these firms exposed weaknesses in their KYC (Know Your Client) AML rules and allowed customers to set up accounts to obtain pre-paid cards in any name of their choosing.  The apparent check and balance was to limit the account sizes to £200 cash.  This means a person can walk into a shop, pay £200 cash into the card over the counter.  You can then use the card to pay for small transactions such as the Postal delivery set up.  Repeatedly funding £200 into a card will provide sufficient funds to facilitate the process of setting up a new person and eventually, a new company.  So, we should note how easy it was and still is to get a pre-paid mastercard in a new name.  Now, legally, if one decides on a change of name and this is done after sending a simple email off to the deed poll company, and it is done so in the name of Joseph Ward, then there is no issue.  You're not fraudulently doing so.  The honest member of the public often has legitimate reasons for wanting a name change, for either religious, personal or formal reasons.  Having a pre-paid mastercard in that name is simply the next logical, legitimate step.

PS. It is also possible to consider a new mobile phone at this stage too.  Also, it is possible to use the latest services with Bitcoin which in our view serves little purpose other than being a bastardised, poor persons, bearer bond facility for the money launderer.  Trading benefits aside of course, it is clearly an area of weakness and something we believe is currently being 'looked into'.

So an account, "pending" document approval, with the post company in the name Joe Ward.  Everything has been aid for in the name Joe Ward so far with them. All they now require is ID.


At this stage, again it is public knowledge that one can apply to the DVLA for a change of name and address on a Drivers License.  To do this, all that is needed is the completion of the Deed Poll form application using the name Joe Ward and new email address.  If an address is asked for then in this example it would be Moneytown.  The applicant can then receive a sealed copy which is followed by a visit to a local GP, professional or other signatory to get the document signature witnessed.   They are witnessing a signature NOT the authenticity of the information contained within it.

Once an application of this sort is complete it would normally then be sent off to the DVLA who will respond within two weeks.  So, the post company receives the DL in the name of Joseph Ward with the address in Cleantown. In this example, if the post company do want ID verification beforehand in order to open the account, the applicant can ask the DVLA to send it to Moneytown.  Then send the ID to the post company.  Then fill in another form with the DVLA for a change of address to Cleantown.  

The applicant will now have a new license, in a new name, with a new address.  The postal company will still have details and address to Moneytown though.  This is a surmountable problem, however we do not wish to divulge too much information, other than to say it can be done legally.  


This section also further highlights a weakness in the system.  Using the above example, if the applicant now goes to "Post Company 2" and opens a new account in the name of Joe Ward, they can set up the account with a post office as a collection point.  For ID the company will require a drivers license copy sent by email.    

This is a normal procedure and one which is currently used legitimately by members of the public throughout the UK.  Following on from the example above, this is particularly user friendly and easy to administer and  an online residential address would now be at:

1 Final House Rd




BUT, the post will now be set up for forwarding to a post office so there would be limited (if any) links to the original Moneytown address of Mr John Smith.  The change of name to Mr Joe Ward of Completown is now complete and, doesn't live in Completown or Moneytown, but instead only collects mail from post office. 


This is a surprising area of weakness in the UK system and one which needs to be tightened up considerably.  It exposes an area that should have been addressed many many years ago and yet still remains stuck in an AML time warp.  The basis of KYC or AML is built on the provision of identity documentation being 100% accurate.  The two main sources of which are, photo ID in the form of a Drivers License, Passport or European equivalent, AND generally a Utility Bill.  So, in reality one cannot be used, or is worthless, without the other and therefore a utility bill is just as important as a passport or drivers license.  So why on earth does the current system make it so easy to obtain proof of residential address from utility company's, which in the day, were only a handful of firms?  Now, there are numerous utility providers and whereas BT was once the only fixed line telephone operator, we now have many other firms in the market who specialise in all sorts of services, the core of which would not fall under the category of a utility firm.  As an example, SKY.  The company once provided broadband and internet which, according to official sources, was not recognised as a fixed utility provider.  Now, the firm offers a fixed land line and the ability (as others) to change details online.  It really is far too easy and if any government were serious about combatting fraud, this relatively low cost loophole could easily be fixed.

So, using the above example, the person starts with SKY and British Gas bills under the name of John Smith at the original address in Moneytown.  Access their account online.  They have the choice of adding an additional service such as a fixed land line package.  Speaking to Sky online and asking them to change the account name and address to Joe Ward at Completown but send out a hard copy to Cleantown is a fairly standard, well known and active request.  It is normally relatively simple to explain why should they ask.   If there are any issues then the applicant would simply have them change it and send it to Cleantown and do the process again, or go online.  The quickest way is to ask the online help team to email a copy.  This is done quickly in normal circumstances and a copy  is received of a landline utility bill in the name of Joe Ward with the Completown address.  The same is as simple, if not simpler, with British Gas.  These company's are all too quick to use online help and outsource operations to countries such as India, but the reality is the staff are not trained to the same degree as staff within Financial Services in the UK when it comes to AML.  Again, another systemic failing which could be cleaned up very easily and cheaply.

At this point an applicant is able to print off a post office certification form and go to a local post office with the original SKY or BG bill.  One can have three certified for a fee of £7.  

At this stage the applicant now has a new address, traceable to a post office, under their new name of of Joe Ward and a drivers license and certified utility bills.  This is all fairly standard in terms of current procedures and provides sufficient documentation for a person to open a company account for example.

SUMMARY - Opinion

All of the above can easily be completed within three weeks.  So all the potential money launderer has to do is decide what entity to have the bank account named under.  If this is done twice by two separate people, then the process is insanely undetectable by then creating an LLP company registered in the UK.  An offshore bank account can easily be set up using new ID's and in the normal course of events, this is where traditional 'layering' kicks in as the firms create a network of accounts, individuals and firms spread across countries ranging from Hong Kong, Columbia and the Cayman Islands.  In theory it is easy to trace and logically one would have expected Artificial Intelligence systems to have already found their way into this process of detection.  If we assume that the money laundering professionals don't have similar access to exponential technology then the vast majority will be running the above 'layering' process as a full time job with hundreds or thousands of people working to create more and more layers of deception.  As the end is, in theory, easy to establish, then the issue for intelligence networks and criminal justice systems is TIME.  This is where AI comes in and by now we would expect that the intelligence services are well underway with exponential digital technological development to already have this within their sights.  By far the biggest barrier to identifying and controlling criminal money laundering activity (apart from greed) is time and number.  The sheer scale of these operations means the intelligence services have to rely on highly accurate zoning of resources to counter act the effects.  This is bound to lead to leaks and escapes and of course, it only takes one well constructed and highly 'padded' network, to become responsible for a huge atrocity or attack on our nation or allies.  This is not rocket science.  They refer to organised crime.  Well that's really all it takes...organisation.  A government body has its advantages certainly in terms of resources and funding.  In reality, a government body is slow, cumbersome and bureaucratic.  With transparency comes delay.  Compared to the terrorist or criminal body, it cannot react as quickly, certainly not in the current guise.  For this reason there will always be conspiracy theories and talk of people working in the 'shadows', non-accountable but effective. The reality is that this is where the 'territorial army' versions of SIS kick in and the experienced professional or agent (self-employed) is able to act alongside their official SIS counterparts but with the benefit of plausible deniability and independence.  Without these operations at our disposal, the battle would be un-winnable. Combined with the resources, financial and operationally, it is an efficient counteraction.

Q: Can we induce an event which leads to a material and significant change in a person’s ability or behaviour which would be useful to an organisation such as MI6?

Straps yourselves in for a little bit of a wild ride, so if extreme sports of the academic or indeed philosophical kind are not your thing, then please unbuckle now and leave the park. The four terms used in the title would appear at first glance to be connected, but for the purposes of this article, are not.  There is a distinct, and key difference in that they refer to a journey of sorts.  The journey of the mind and neural functionality that eventually leads to a change which has been caused by an ‘event’. Each term describes a condition.  A condition of the brain at a point in the journey. 

Where did my Taxi Driver and my money go?”


Whenever there is a radical and rapid development in Technology, the voices of those who fear the human effects of such developments sing loud.  Of course, debate is ultimately a healthy proposition when conducted in the correct manner i.e a respectful exchange of ideas, evidence and facts to determine the truth or at least the likelihood of why ‘something’ happens.  The problem is that as we venture further up the emotional curve and hit the raw nerve of public consciousness, a healthy debate, absent of extreme views, is less and less likely.   This is quite possibly the stage we are at now when it comes to the vast changes of technological development at exponential rates of growth.  If one then throws into the mix a subject such as Artificial Intelligence, which has been the subject of many a doomsday prophecy, especially in the fictional world, then the prediction of likely effects  becomes distorted.  There are a vast number of capillaceous issues branching out from each topic within AI and on a scale which precludes us from analysis in this article due to time.  However, there are rarely more topics as emotive as a person's job and their ability to generate income in order to survive...so will driverless cars render the taxi driver extinct and will money even be necessary in any form? Read More. 13.08.19

Dark Web

An Opportunity or Threat?

Perceived wisdom suggests the Dark Web is synonymous with illegal activities involving weapons, drugs and pedophiia.  The assumption has been that if you use it, then you have something sinister to hide.  To be fair, closure of drug giants like "Silk Road" did nothing to change those perceptions.  However, in the big brother world of surveillance, the search for privacy is demanded by the majority and will be found in some way or another.  Furthermore, in a society where people are being increasingly attracted to the fringes of life,  the shift to increasing usage of the Dark Web is a given.  That does not mean it is wrong however, and as we often witness, it is people from the 'fringes' who sometimes operate outside of social norms, who provide the greatest sources of innovation.  We firmly believe the dark web will undergo an upgrade of sorts and although usual, non-secured browser based sites will attract some attention, their days are numbered.  The really exciting proposition is to predict Dark Web 2.0, 3.0 and so on. Rather ironically, but understandably, it is the law enforcement and intelligence agencies who are spending more and more resources on hiding within the shadows of the Dark Web.  It has been the most effective way so far.  However, as it grows, it will it continue to be the safe haven of the criminal or will some form of regulation (such as was with the legalisation of drugs etc), prevent the extreme offenders?  Take the example of Silk Road. It is not only possible, it is probable.  Whether you are in favour of legalisation generally or not,  in many cases it is a safer option.  Many of the sites that offered Marijuana were ran as slick commercial organisations where consumer satisfaction was paramount.  The product was therefore of superior quality (apparently) and it was offered within the relative safety of the internet and not some dark street corner.  Maybe that one is for the liberals out there.  For our purposes however, it shows that the deep dark web does actually have a USP which can be monetized, namely privacy.  Looking further head therefore, the real drug that will sell well in our 'Orwellian' future, is anonymity.  That will undoubtedly be the most precious of commodities.


As it stands now however, people and the societies they live in tend to display tendencies to self-regulate and yes, whilst there is always potential for abuse, the masses will (or should) drive the market to some degree of parity.  There are certainly huge opportunities around the corner.  A secured 'blockchain'esque' physical depository for parcel delivery is bound to happen on a large scale and accompany the growth of the Dark Web.  That is because the only chink in its armour at the moment is complete anonymity with delivery of items. Imagine a secure facility where parcels (aka Data) entering from one side, is subjected to 'scrambling' (aka 'Encryption') and leave the other side to be collected by a seemingly unconnected party (aka 'You').  Now multiply that across every City in the UK.  You then have what one can REALLY call an encrypted, secure, supply chain that would be undetectable to all agencies and, most importantly, legal  Read More.

There are many ways to recruit a spy.  Certainly too many to cover in an article such as this. It really depends on who the particular intelligence agency is looking for, which organization, and what its objective is.  It will come as no surprise that some methods are more or less well publicized than others.  For SIS in particular, given that the organization did not officially exist until 1994, many of the methods used for recruitment are, for obvious reasons, still closely guarded secrets.  Graduate recruitment is one thing, but developing a potential (currently operational) agent is another, especially if they are already in full time professional employment or indeed, working for another intelligence agency. 


The PR stance at the moment may well be to promote a progressive, modern image, and in many ways it most definitely is.  However, the traditional ‘tap on the shoulder’ approach was really symptomatic of a desire to retain control of the recruitment process.  To that end, things have not really changed.  SIS has, and always will be, more cautious about the ‘walk in’ candidate and will have entirely different, and more complex, processes in place to evaluate such a person.  Furthermore, the complex recruitment cycle is now refined to the point where SIS can recruit individuals without them even knowing.  Now that’s surely the recruiters’ holy grail.  As with all things ‘intelligence’ orientated, there is a constant focus on resources and purchasing power.  SIS needs to maximise the value of each pound spent and therefore, long and complex targeting of individuals used to gain information, has to be considered against the costs of recruiting those intelligence officers charged with interpreting that information.  So, in essence, a balancing act in the same way as any other modern-day commercial organisation.  Let’s not forget however, that despite the budget allocated by the Intelligence Committee and oversight of section 5, 6 and GCHQ, there are still relatively few intelligence officers out there. Especially in the ever-changing competitive world of private intelligence agencies and their corporate counterparts which compounds the problems caused by the brain drain and external temptations.


SIS Chief Alex Younger said in his speech at St Andrews that “If you think you can spot an MI6 officer, you are mistaken. It doesn’t matter where you are from. If you want to make a difference and you think you might have what it takes, then the chances are that you do have what it takes, and we hope you will step forward.”  Clearly this is a nod to the future and the recognition that with Espionage 4.0 around the corner, intelligence agencies need to invest now and allow time for the training and development of new individuals.  Individuals that could take two or more years to develop before assuming roles of increased responsibility and clout.  This is the likely reason and not, as some cynics have suggested, merely PR propaganda developed for the benefit of our adversaries to suggest that UK intelligence is growing.  The argument here being that even if the funds are not available, and even if the organisation is cutting costs, creating the illusion that the funds are there is just as effective.


So far the common denominator is money.  Whether it is the level of funding, or the maximisation of value for each pound spent.  Mr Younger’s comments clearly pushes ideology as a motivator and driver for potential candidates, and one can hardly blame him.  Let’s face it, it would be hard for SIS to push the financial incentive when faced with free market competition.  So, it is a given that the organisation has to, regardless of whether it is true or not, sell the notion of ‘making a difference’ as the key driver.  So, enter the ‘buddhist spy’ i.e. someone who has forsaken all desires of financial or materialistic rewards in favour of….that little bit more.  Here, the idea that freedom is power is never more true, but by god it’s a tough one to find, especially in the younger recruits.  Money can never be the sole motivator in this profession, but the complexities of life, youth, character and practical issues, means it simply is important.  One cannot really attribute this simply to youth either.  Yes, the younger recruits may well be ambitious and dazzled at the prospect of financial reward, but then again so is the 42 year old married man with three children.  So its not that.  Indeed, the tap on the shoulder system which focussed on the Oxbridge folk probably worked largely because they were the elite and on the whole from upper middle class affluent backgrounds where they always has the family vault to nudge open in times of desperation.  Ironically, this student and the buddhist spy are similar in that they are both free from financial pressures thereby making them more effective. 


So, they key thread to pull from the above is that there is power to be had from the freedom of external influences.  Without wanting to drift down the spiritual or philosophical road too much, a successful spy in todays world could be the one who can happily remove any influence, both positive or negative.  In the case of the honey trap, it would be rendered useless if the person did not attribute so much influence to sex.  In the case of financial reward, bribery or extortion, if one truly has zero desire for money then it is powerless.  In the case of power itself, if one is sufficiently self confident to the point where the affirmation from power is not needed, then that too is rendered useless.  So the buddhist spy almost becomes machine like.  Perhaps this is another case for the advancement of the neurodiverse, or those people less emotionally driven to some extent, in favour of the ‘safety’ of the binary world.  In essence, the buddhist spy is simply a person who cannot be bought, and therefore cannot be compromised.  Could you be that person?



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