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Counter Proliferation

 

The UK Government spends an increasing amount of time and resources dedicated to combat what has become a global proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN) and SIS plays a crucial role.

 

SIS obtains crucial intelligence on Foreign States that aim to get hold of these weapons, and it disrupts their efforts and stop the proliferation. One of its highest profile successes in the area was the role in putting AQ Khan, who ran the largest nuclear proliferation network the world has ever seen, completely out of business.

 

Working with the UK’s other intelligence agencies and partners overseas, SIS also helps to ensure UK weapons exports are rigorously controlled so they don’t get into the hands of terrorists or states.

National Counter Proliferation Strategy to 2020 (UK Gov)

 

Summary The Counter Proliferation Strategy to 2020 provides a framework for the United Kingdom’s counter proliferation activity. Our overall aim is to prevent the spread or further development of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) capability or advanced military technology which could threaten UK interests or regional stability. The new strategy focuses UK action around three strands: influencing intent: encourage all states to adhere to norms on the possession and use of particular weapons, and to demonstrate the consequences of breaching those norms; controlling access: control access to materials and knowledge globally to make it as hard as possible for states or terrorists to acquire or develop capabilities; disrupting networks: disrupt illicit attempts to circumvent controls The Counter Proliferation Strategy to 2020 will be delivered by the cross-Government counter proliferation community. At the heart of this will be the new Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre and the Export Controls Joint Unit announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. The Foreign Secretary will retain overall Ministerial responsibility for the Strategy. Introduction The 2012-2015 Counter Proliferation Strategy1 guided the UK’s work during the last Parliament, with progress reported through the Annual Reports on the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review2 . The National Security Council agreed an updated strategy to set the direction to 2020. Many of the challenges remain, but the new Counter Proliferation Strategy takes as its starting point the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review and National Security Risk Assessment. The Strategic Defence and Security Review states: “Rules and norms to counter the proliferation of illicit arms and weapons of mass destruction play a vital role in our security. The UK has consistently been at the forefront of international efforts to tackle proliferation. We devote substantial efforts to this and will continue to do so.”

 

The National Security Risk Assessment has two proliferation-related risks. Both are highlighted as risks which may become even more likely and/or more impactful over the longer term: CBRN attacks: attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons; Weapons Proliferation: increase in either advanced conventional armaments or CBRN technology. In the period 2012 to 2015 there has been progress against the previous Counter Proliferation Strategy in a number of important areas: a deal has been agreed with Iran on their nuclear programme; the declared Syrian chemical weapons stockpile has been destroyed; and the Arms Trade Treaty has entered into force.

 

The UK has played a leading role in all of these important achievements. But some of the issues identified in the 2012- 2015 Counter Proliferation Strategy remain of concern, highlighted most recently by the nuclear test on 6 January and continued launches using ballistic missile technology conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Other developments, such as credible reports that Daesh has used chemical weapons in attacks in Syria and Iraq and technological advances such as the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons and 3D printing, have added to the challenge. The Strategy guides our work to disrupt, mitigate and limit the spread of the capabilities that increase the proliferation-related risk to national security. We seek to ensure that we have the right controls and security in place domestically and to work internationally through the rules-based international system. The Strategy complements other government strategies which address elements of the challenge. These include the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST, the UK Biosecurity Strategy and the UK Cyber Security Strategy. Aim The overall aim of the Counter Proliferation Strategy to 2020 is to prevent the spread or further development of CBRN capability or advanced military technology which could threaten UK interests or regional stability. Objectives The Strategy structures our effort around three strands. First, we seek to influence the intent of others, as the most effective way of controlling capabilities. Second, we seek to control global access to the materials and knowledge that would allow a hostile state or terrorist group to act on that intent. And third, we seek to identify and disrupt illicit attempts to circumvent those controls. In particular: We will continue to support the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. The international safeguards regime, which underpins Iran’s commitment to enhanced verification and inspections, will give the international community confidence whether Iran’s nuclear programme is, and will remain, exclusively peaceful.

 

If at any time Iran fails to meet its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, international sanctions will be re-imposed. We will maintain pressure on Syria to comply fully with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. We will support the mechanisms established by the UN Security Council and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to ensure that all those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria are held to account, and that the chemical weapons programme is fully disclosed and destroyed. We will focus our efforts at the final Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 on reducing the risk of nuclear material and information falling into the hands of terrorists and criminals by working towards the full implementation of global standards for maintaining the security of nuclear material. We will continue our efforts under the Global Threat Reduction Programme to improve global long-term nuclear and radiological security in a sustainable manner. We will also continue to support the International Atomic Energy Agency as they take on a greater leadership role after the Summit has concluded. We remain committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to the creation of a Middle East Zone free from nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We will continue to campaign for successful negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and universal membership of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We will campaign to increase the number of countries that have ratified and implemented the Arms Trade Treaty so it can deliver the expected step-change in the rules-based international system governing the trade in conventional arms. The UK contribution The extent to which the UK takes responsibility for a global threat such as counter proliferation flows from the policy as reflected in key Strategic Defence and Security Review decisions about the UK’s role in the world. Some threats may specifically target or affect the UK, but on most we share the risks and the burden with allies and relevant international organisations. We work closely with allies, deploying our diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and scientific expertise to tackle these challenges. The UK is at the heart of the international architecture on counter proliferation. We are an active member of the UN, International Atomic Energy Agency, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other organisations which develop rules and guidance, and assist and verify compliance across counter proliferation and CBRN security. The UK provides direct assistance to countries to strengthen implementation of key international resolutions and to improve nuclear security. As active members of the key export control regimes, we seek to strengthen and harmonise controls. The delivery of the Counter Proliferation Strategy is a cross-government effort led by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with other departments contributing; this includes our security and intelligence agencies. The new Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre and the Export Controls Joint Unit announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review will be at the heart of this work. We will evaluate and report progress as part of the implementation of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The Foreign Secretary will retain overall Ministerial responsibility for the Strategy, with the National Security Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, ultimately overseeing its implementation. March 2016

The Remora Principle
The CEO at Patrium Intelligence (one of our appointed Private Intelligence Agencies) recently coined the term "The Remora Principle" and how it describes a method of operating within Secret Intelligence globally.  The phrase to 'operate within the shadows' is often used, however the Remora Principle outlines in specific detail how effective intelligence gathering is achieved by not only staying within the shadows of a larger, more distracting element, but to move with it.  It provides key steps Intelligence Agents should take to ensure effective information gathering and reporting to officers, and focuses more on modern technological advancement.  By following the steps outlined within the Remora Principle, one is able to then tailor specific actions that are applicable to individual operations.
Q: Can we induce an event which leads to a material and significant change in a person’s ability or behaviour which would be useful to an organisation such as MI6?

Straps yourselves in for a little bit of a wild ride, so if extreme sports of the academic or indeed philosophical kind are not your thing, then please unbuckle now and leave the park. The four terms used in the title would appear at first glance to be connected, but for the purposes of this article, are not.  There is a distinct, and key difference in that they refer to a journey of sorts.  The journey of the mind and neural functionality that eventually leads to a change which has been caused by an ‘event’. Each term describes a condition.  A condition of the brain at a point in the journey. 

Where did my Taxi Driver and my money go?”

 

Whenever there is a radical and rapid development in Technology, the voices of those who fear the human effects of such developments sing loud.  Of course, debate is ultimately a healthy proposition when conducted in the correct manner i.e a respectful exchange of ideas, evidence and facts to determine the truth or at least the likelihood of why ‘something’ happens.  The problem is that as we venture further up the emotional curve and hit the raw nerve of public consciousness, a healthy debate, absent of extreme views, is less and less likely.   This is quite possibly the stage we are at now when it comes to the vast changes of technological development at exponential rates of growth.  If one then throws into the mix a subject such as Artificial Intelligence, which has been the subject of many a doomsday prophecy, especially in the fictional world, then the prediction of likely effects  becomes distorted.  There are a vast number of capillaceous issues branching out from each topic within AI and on a scale which precludes us from analysis in this article due to time.  However, there are rarely more topics as emotive as a person's job and their ability to generate income in order to survive...so will driverless cars render the taxi driver extinct and will money even be necessary in any form? Read More. 13.08.19

Dark Web

An Opportunity or Threat?

Perceived wisdom suggests the Dark Web is synonymous with illegal activities involving weapons, drugs and pedophiia.  The assumption has been that if you use it, then you have something sinister to hide.  To be fair, closure of drug giants like "Silk Road" did nothing to change those perceptions.  However, in the big brother world of surveillance, the search for privacy is demanded by the majority and will be found in some way or another.  Furthermore, in a society where people are being increasingly attracted to the fringes of life,  the shift to increasing usage of the Dark Web is a given.  That does not mean it is wrong however, and as we often witness, it is people from the 'fringes' who sometimes operate outside of social norms, who provide the greatest sources of innovation.  We firmly believe the dark web will undergo an upgrade of sorts and although usual, non-secured browser based sites will attract some attention, their days are numbered.  The really exciting proposition is to predict Dark Web 2.0, 3.0 and so on. Rather ironically, but understandably, it is the law enforcement and intelligence agencies who are spending more and more resources on hiding within the shadows of the Dark Web.  It has been the most effective way so far.  However, as it grows, it will it continue to be the safe haven of the criminal or will some form of regulation (such as was with the legalisation of drugs etc), prevent the extreme offenders?  Take the example of Silk Road. It is not only possible, it is probable.  Whether you are in favour of legalisation generally or not,  in many cases it is a safer option.  Many of the sites that offered Marijuana were ran as slick commercial organisations where consumer satisfaction was paramount.  The product was therefore of superior quality (apparently) and it was offered within the relative safety of the internet and not some dark street corner.  Maybe that one is for the liberals out there.  For our purposes however, it shows that the deep dark web does actually have a USP which can be monetized, namely privacy.  Looking further head therefore, the real drug that will sell well in our 'Orwellian' future, is anonymity.  That will undoubtedly be the most precious of commodities.

 

As it stands now however, people and the societies they live in tend to display tendencies to self-regulate and yes, whilst there is always potential for abuse, the masses will (or should) drive the market to some degree of parity.  There are certainly huge opportunities around the corner.  A secured 'blockchain'esque' physical depository for parcel delivery is bound to happen on a large scale and accompany the growth of the Dark Web.  That is because the only chink in its armour at the moment is complete anonymity with delivery of items. Imagine a secure facility where parcels (aka Data) entering from one side, is subjected to 'scrambling' (aka 'Encryption') and leave the other side to be collected by a seemingly unconnected party (aka 'You').  Now multiply that across every City in the UK.  You then have what one can REALLY call an encrypted, secure, supply chain that would be undetectable to all agencies and, most importantly, legal  Read More.

Innovation, technology and the military are inextricably linked, and throughout history whenever there is a technological breakthrough, one of the first beneficiaries is invariably the military.  Whether it is recent developments such as GPS, or much later, Galileo selling telescopes to Italian monasteries to see enemy ships approaching, the human desire to conquer or defend is paramount. With the 'genie' firmly out of the bottle, Artifical Intelligence will become a 'game changer' in the Military world as for many, the upsides are simply too strong to worry about potentially disastrous consequences.  Here we take a look at the detail and the precise areas of growth just around the corner.Read More

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